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Sammendrag:  
For å nå klimamål som maksimal oppvarming på 2 oC 
til 2100 er det nødvendig med ei breiare deltaking av 
land enn i Kyotoprotokollen. Dette vil også krevje at 
utsleppa frå utviklingsland blir redusert. Ein 
interessant ide er ei 'fleir-trinns' tilnærming, der land 
må ta på seg strengare klimamål etter som dei utviklar 
seg og får større brutto nasjonalprodukt (BNP) og 
utslepp av klimagassar per capita. Vi analyserer ein 
fleir-trinns avtale med tre trinn, der land med lav BNP 
og utslepp per capita blir plassert i trinn 1 og har ingen 
krav om å redusere sine utslepp, land med middels 
BNP og utslepp per capita blir plassert i trinn 2 og må 
redusere sine utslepp relativt til BNP, og land med 
høgast BNP og utslepp per capita blir plassert i trinn 3 
og må redusere sine utslepp av klimagassar. Vi 
studerer kor langt ulike variantar av ein indeks basert 
på BNP per capita og utslepp per capita kan føre oss 
mot avtaler som kan godtakast av det einskilde land, 
der den viktigaste indikatoren for at land skal kunne 
akeseptere avtalen er at industrialiserte land kjem i 
trinn 3, og dei minst utvikla landa kjem i trinn 1. 
Denne tilnærminga medfører at utviklingsland med 
rask vekst kan bli plassert i trinn 3. Eit hovudresultat 
er at ein avtale basert på ein indeks som berre inneheld 
BNP per capita og utslepp per capita har ein relativt 
liten sjanse til å bli godteke av mange land. Tek vi i 
tillegg med mål på institusjonell kapasitet, som 
indeksar for 'Human Development' og 'Governance', 
vil sjansen for at landa skal godta ein slik avtale stige, 
og endå meir dersom det er ein føresetnad at alle 
industrialiserte land blir plassert i trinn 3. Tilpassing til 
klimaendring er spesielt viktig for utviklingsland, men 
kan sannsynlegvis takast betre vare på gjennom ein 
eigen protokoll enn gjennom ei direkte kopling til ein 
fleir-trinns avtale. 
Abstract:  To meet a climate target like maximum 2 
oC temperature increase by 2100, participation in 
efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases must 
be broader than that in the Kyoto Protocol. It will also 
require emission reductions efforts in developing 
countries. The 'multi-stage' approach is an interesting 
idea, where countries take on stronger emission 
mitigation commitments as they develop and expand 
their per capita gross domestic product and greenhouse 
gas emissions. This report examines a three-stage 
variant of the multi-stage approach, where countries 
with low GDP and emissions per capita are placed in 
stage 1 and have no commitments, countries with 
medium level GDP and emissions are placed in stage 2 
and must limit emissions relative to GDP, and 
countries with the highest GDP and emissions per 
capita are placed in stage 3 and must reduce emissions 
in absolute terms. We explore how far different 
variants of an index based on per capita GDP and 
emissions can take us in the direction of pointing out a 
politically feasible regime architecture, where the most 
important political feasibility indicator is the 
placement of industrialized countries in stage 3 and 
least developed countries in stage 1. This approach 
may result in rapidly industrializing developing 
countries being placed in stage 3. A main finding is 
that an agreement based on an index containing GDP 
per capita and emissions per capita only has a 
relatively low political feasibility, but this is improved 
if Human Development or Governance indices are 
included, and furthermore if we require that all 
industrialized countries are placed in stage 3. 
Adaptation to climate change is of particular 
importance to developing countries, but is better 
handled through a separate protocol than linking this 
issue directly to the multi-stage approach. 
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1 Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol, with its target period 2008 to 2012, entered into force 16 February 2005. 
So far there have not been any real negotiations on ‘beyond-Kyoto’ climate policy 
commitments. Such negotiations will face two major challenges: The first is to develop 
stronger commitments for the Annex I Parties (industrialized countries as defined by the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC) and to include the United States and 
Australia in multilateral climate policy collaboration beyond Kyoto. The second is to broaden 
the participation from non-Annex I Parties (developing countries). In this report we focus on a 
multi-stage framework as a promising approach to engage developing countries more strongly 
than what has so far been possible. In a companion study, Tjernshaugen (2005) has assessed 
major obstacles to U.S. participation in multilateral efforts to control greenhouse gas 
emissions, and suggests some possible strategies for reengaging the United States. Both 
reports are efforts to prepare parties and stakeholders for upcoming negotiations. There are a 
number of other issues that are important for beyond-Kyoto negotiations. A second 
companion study explores these, see Torvanger et al. (2004). 
A major challenge in the efforts to control man-made emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) beyond the Kyoto Protocol is to engage developing countries in limiting the growth of 
their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), and eventually stabilizing their emissions. 
Because industrialized countries have both been responsible for the bulk of the emissions up 
to the present and have a greater economic capacity, and because poor countries need to 
develop their economies and provide better living conditions for their citizens, both the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol state that industrialized countries must take the lead to 
reduce global GHG emissions. However, it will be impossible to limit global temperature 
increase by 2100 to e.g. 2 °C without controlling and eventually reducing emissions from 
developing countries.1 Large developing countries with fast-growing economies, such as 
China and India, are particularly important. Some countries that are considered to be 
developing (i.e. not included in Annex I of the Climate Convention), such as South Korea, 
Taiwan and Chile, have a higher per capita GDP than industrialized countries such as Latvia 
and Russia.2 
We argue that to engage developing countries in more active efforts to limit emissions, a 
more flexible agreement framework than the Kyoto Protocol is needed. In this article we 
discuss one important category of flexibility, namely the grouping of non-Annex I Parties (i.e. 
developing countries) and determining when these countries should take on different types of 
commitments to limit their emissions (see Ott et al. 2004, and Höhne et al. 2003, and 2004). 
Thus we explore variants of the “multi-stage approach” (confer Gupta 1998 and 2003, and 
Berk and den Elzen 2001). We focus on the “Capacity-Responsibility (CR)” index, defined as 
the sum of emissions per capita and GDP per capita measured in suitable units (see Criqui et 
al. 2003a and den Elzen et al. 2003), which is a tool that allows further differentiation 
between the Parties in the heterogeneous group of non-Annex I countries. Lately the EU has 
expressed some preference for this approach (EC 2005:45).3 In a multi-stage approach 
countries are assigned to one of three (or four) categories, or stages, on the basis of their 
development level. Countries in the first category have no commitments to limit their 
emissions, whereas countries in the second category should reduce their emissions relative to 
                                                     
1 The EU has proposed a long-term climate policy target defined as a maximum global warming of 2 
°C by 2100. 
2 Based on the World Resources Institute CAIT database, where GDP is measured in 2000 USD 
adjusted for purchasing power parities. 
3 “The ‘staged approach’ is a promising way to provide for differentiated participation by developing 
countries” (EC 2005:45). 
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GDP. Countries in the third category should achieve an absolute reduction of their emissions. 
In this report, we explore different variants of and modifications of the CR index as 
alternative indicators for defining the stages or thresholds for participation. These indicators 
are then combined with a Human Development Index (HDI), a Governance index, and an 
institutional affiliation index.4 The general idea is that when developing countries grow and 
increase their GDP, GHG emissions tend to grow also. At some stage they will graduate from 
stage 1 to stage 2, or from stage 2 to stage 3. The aim of this study is to explore how far 
different variants of the Capacity-Responsibility index, including Human Development and 
Governance indices, can take us in the direction of pointing out a politically feasible regime 
architecture, where the most important political feasibility indicator is the placement of 
Annex I (industrialized) countries in stage 3, least developed countries in stage 1, and other 
developing countries in stages 1 or 2. This approach makes it possible for rapidly 
industrializing developing countries with sufficiently high per capita GDP and GHG 
emissions to be placed in stage 3. 
We limit the discussion to choice of indicators and threshold values that define the 
transition (graduation) thresholds between the three stages. This means that we do not 
elaborate on the various types of commitments or targets that the different stages could 
contain, or discuss how commitments should be differentiated across countries within each 
stage based on the CR index or other indicators. Furthermore, we use single year observations 
of emissions and GDP, and do not elaborate on the dynamic (graduation) aspects of the multi-
stage approach, for example when specific countries will graduate to higher stages given a 
development scenario. 
In the second section we survey major interpretations of the multi-stage approach based on 
existing literature. The third and main section of the article analyses eight cases of graduation 
thresholds and consequences for countries in terms of positioning in stage 1, 2 or 3, followed 
by a political feasibility assessment of the outcomes. For feasibility reasons, Annex I 
countries should end up in stage 3, whereas e.g. least developed countries should end up in 
stage 1. Section four discusses adaptation to climate change with a focus on developing 
countries and an adaptation protocol as an addition to a multi-stage climate policy agreement. 
Finally, in section five the analysis is summarized to assess the overall feasibility of the multi-
stage approach and provide policy implications. An annex presents tables showing the 
detailed results for all countries of the world based on a selection of a few of the graduation 
threshold cases.  
2 A survey of multi-stage climate policy approaches 
With the need for broader participation in the climate regime, the development of a future 
international architecture may take different directions. Assuming a Kyoto Protocol-type 
regime with national GHG emission constraints, there are two ways to broaden participation. 
Either an incremental evolution of the regime, i.e. gradual expansion of the Annex I group, or 
a “structural regime change, i.e. defining the evolution of emission allowances for all Parties 
over a longer period” (Berk and den Elzen 2001:465). The latter ‘full participation’ regime 
could adopt a set of rules or targets that define the evolution of emission quotas for all Parties 
over a long time period, e.g. such as ‘Per capita Convergence’ (Convergence and Contraction) 
(Meyer 2000), ‘Soft landing’ (Blanchard et al. 2001) and ‘Global Preference Score approach’ 
(Bartsch and Müller 2000). See figure 1 for a general overview of these different approaches 
to a global climate regime. 
This report focuses on the alternative direction, namely an incremental broadening of the 
climate regime. How can the group of countries with binding quantified emission limitation 
                                                     
4 The HDI index is used by UN bodies, see UNDP (2004). The HDI and Governance indices are from 
the CAIT database (http://cait.wri.org/).  
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or reduction objectives be gradually expanded? Berk and den Elzen (2001) call this track an 
‘increasing participation’ regime and label it a ‘multi-stage regime’ when different categories 
of countries and targets are considered. Differentiation between the Parties in terms of when 
(to take on commitments) and what (commitments to take on) is the central idea of a multi-
stage regime.  
 
Figure 1: Categorization of emission endowment schemes (Criqui 2003a: 15).  
2.1 Multi-stage approaches 
‘Multi-stage’ approaches have been developed by Gupta (1998), Stewart and Wiener (2001) 
and den Elzen et al. (2001). ‘The aim with such a system is to ensure that countries with 
comparative circumstances in economic, developmental and environmental terms have 
comparative responsibilities/commitments under the climate regime. Moreover, the system 
defines when their level of responsibility/commitment change as their circumstances change.’ 
(Berk et al. 2001a:29).   
Gupta (1998) proposed a categorisation of five different groups that have different 
commitments depending on their capabilities (in the form of ability to pay): Least-Developed 
Countries (LDCs) with low emissions; other LDCs; MIC – middle-income developing 
countries; and high-income developing countries (HIDC) (Gupta 1998). 
The Parties may alternatively be grouped according to mainly economic criteria and 
emissions levels, such as in Blanchard et al. (2001) and Criqui et al. (2003a). Three variants 
of the multi-stage approach are presented in table 1, taken from Criqui et al. (2003b).  
The upper part of the table relates to the S550e scenario, which is stabilization of the 
concentration of the six Kyoto Protocol GHGs in the atmosphere at 550 parts per million by 
volume CO2 equivalents by 2100, whereas the lower part of the table relates to the similar 650 
parts per million by volume scenario. There are three stages: stage 1 with no commitments; 
stage 2 with intensity targets (reduce emissions relative to GDP); and stage 3 with absolute 
emission reduction targets. Then there are three variants of the multi-stage approach: MS1, 
MS2, and MS3. In terms of thresholds, these variants differ only in the transition from stages 
2 to 3, which is from intensity targets to absolute targets. In the first variant (MS1), a 
country’s entry into stage 3 depends on a threshold that is defined as a proportion of the world 
average per capita emission level (100% in the 550 scenario, and 120% in the 650 scenario). 
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In the second variant (MS2), a Capacity-Responsibility (CR) index is used, with a value that 
is about twice that used for the stage 1 to stage 2 threshold.5 In the third variant (MS3), entry 
into stage 3 begins after a stabilization period, which is fixed and pre-determined, and allows 
the rate of growth in emissions to be progressively reduced to zero. In addition there are 
differences in the way targets are defined across the multi-stage approach variants and 
between stages 2 and 3. These are not commented on further since in this study we focus on 
graduation thresholds. The different thresholds and the differentiation rules at each stage have 
to be differentiated according to the global emission profile. Under the S650e case, where the 
concentrations of the six Kyoto Protocol GHGs in the atmosphere are stabilized at 650 parts 
per million by volume CO2 equivalents by 2100, there is a less pressing need for developing 
countries to contribute to global emissions control. This means that the parameters can be 
substantially relaxed compared to the much more stringent S550e case. Furthermore, the CR 
threshold values are higher, the stabilization periods are longer, and the maximum value for 
the de-carbonization rate is lower. 
Table 1: A multi-stage approach based on economic criteria and emissions. 
 
Source: Criqui et al. (2003b). 
 
(*)The de-carbonisation rate, expressed in percentage reduction per year, is a linear function of per capita income 
(GDP/cap):a x GDP/cap, a = 0.33, with a maximum de-carbonisation rate. 
 
(**)The length of the stabilisation period is given by the transition constant (TC) and is calculated by dividing the TC 
by per capita emissions (in tCO2/cap.yr) in the reference period: e.g. if the transition constant is 70, a region with a 
per capita emission level of 5 will have to bring down its emission growth rate to zero in 14 years.  
 
                                                     
5 See section 2.2 for details on the CR index. 
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2.2 Methods and indicators for grouping and graduation of countries 
In future agreements, it is a likely option that the Parties, particularly the non-Annex I Parties, 
will be differentiated and split in different groups. Such grouping for the purpose of 
differentiation of commitments could be based on a given indicator or a combination of 
several indicators, such as emissions per capita, GDP per capita, human development index, 
total emissions, or historical responsibility for temperature change (Claussen and McNeilly 
1998; Bodansky 2003). 
In this section, the main indicators used in this report for grouping and graduation of 
countries to higher stages are discussed. The main indicators are capacity-responsibility (CR) 
index, the human development index (HDI), the governance index, and institutional 
affiliation.6 
As illustrated by figure 2, there is a clear positive correlation between emissions per capita 
(responsibility) and GDP per capita (capacity/ability to pay),7 although the carbon intensity 
(emissions per GDP) of the economy decreases over time/with income in most countries.8  
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Figure 2. Emissions (tons CO2 equivalents) per capita and income (GDP $ PPP) per capita 
for 184 countries in the CAIT database. 2000. 
 
Figure 3 groups the countries by their income per capita levels, but excludes the two 
countries Qatar and Luxembourg due to their extreme values on emissions and income, 
respectively. Excluding the extreme outliers Qatar and Luxembourg better illustrates the 
distribution of the large majority of countries in the scatter plot. 
                                                     
6 In this study, countries are divided into two groups by institutional affiliation, either Annex I (i.e. 
industrialized countries as defined by the UNFCCC) or non-Annex I countries. 
7 Jacoby et al. (1999) propose ability to pay as the single indicator for participation in a future climate 
architecture.  
8 See Ringius et al. (2002) for a discussion of fairness principles in the context of climate policy. 
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Figure 3. Emissions (tons CO2 equivalents) per capita and income (GDP $ PPP) per capita. 
Qatar and Luxembourg are excluded due to their extreme values. 2000. 
 
2.2.1 CR index 
The Capacity-Responsibility (CR) index builds on the positive correlation between emissions 
per capita and income per capita as shown in figures 2 and 3. The CR index is a mixed 
indicator drawing from Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC, which states that ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ should be taken into account in 
defining the appropriate action of the different Parties. Criqui et al. (2003a) define the CR 
index as the per capita income in thousand 1999 Euros plus the per capita CO2-equivalent 
emissions in tCO2 in 2000. Per capita income is a common variant of the ‘ability to pay’ or 
‘capacity’ fairness principle, whereas emissions per capita is a variant of the ‘polluter pays’ 
(or ‘responsibility’) principle, or even the ‘egalitarian’ (or ‘need’) principle (Ringius et al. 
2002).  
This composite index combines values of different nature and can thus in principle be 
weighted or normalized in various ways, as we do in cases 5–8 in the next section. However, 
Criqui et al. (2003a) find that a one-to-one weight produces fairly satisfactory results for 
grouping regions and countries. Calculating the CR index values for some selected countries 
(USA, Canada, Japan, China and India) but mostly on a regional basis, they place countries 
and regions into three stages of commitments based on the resulting CR index values. The 
idea is then that as countries over time become richer and/or larger GHG emitters, their CR 
index values will increase and they may graduate into a different stage in terms of 
commitments to reduce GHG emissions. The three different stages are defined as: 
Stage 1 (CR<5): no commitment;  
Stage 2 (5<CR<12): carbon intensity targets; and 
Stage 3 (CR>12):  absolute emission reduction targets. 
2.2.2 Human Development Index (HDI) 
The human development index (HDI) is commonly used to assess, rank and group countries 
in terms of their development. The HDI is a composite index reflecting life expectancy at 
birth; adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and 
tertiary schools; and GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars (UNDP 
2004). The HDI ranges from 0 to 1. Countries are often placed into three different groups, 
namely high human development (HDI>0.8), medium human development (0.8>HDI>0.5) 
and low human development (HDI<0.5). 
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2.2.3 Governance index 
The Aggregated Governance Indicator attempts to capture the complex and multifaceted 
aspects of governance as a composite index based on six dimensions of governance: (1) 
political stability, (2) government effectiveness, (3) regulatory quality, (4) rule of law, (5) 
voice and accountability, and (6) corruption. These dimensions are weighted equally in the 
indicator. This governance indicator, devised by the World Bank, draws on many separate 
sources of subjective data on perceptions of governance constructed by multiple 
organizations. (CAIT 2005; underlying source is World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2003)). 
2.2.4 Institutional affiliation 
Differentiation between the Parties is central to the idea of a multi-stage regime. The Kyoto 
Protocol and the Climate Convention differentiate between the Parties on the basis of 
institutional membership. In 1992, the Parties listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC were the 24 
original members of OECD and countries with economies in transition (EIT), see table 2.9 
Table 2. Institutional affiliation of countries in Annex I of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol 
Annex I to the UNFCCC (41 countries plus EEC as a separate 
party) 
These Parties agreed to try to limit/return their greenhouse-gas 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 as per Article 4.2 (a) 
and (b). 
OECD (and IEA) members 
among the non-Annex I 
Parties 
24 original OECD members,d the 
European Union  
14 countries with 
economies in 
transitione 
Recent (post-1992) OECD 
entries 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, European Economic Community 
(EEC), Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland,d Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan,b 
Liechtenstein,a Luxembourg, Monaco,a The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey,c United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, United States 
Belarus,f Bulgaria, 
Croatia,a Czech 
Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland,d 
Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovakia,d 
Slovenia,a Ukraine 
Korea (12 December 1996), 
Mexico (18 May 1994)d 
a Liechtenstein and Monaco are not members of OECD, but joined Annex I at COP 3 together with 
Croatia and Slovenia. 
b Added to Annex I only for the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol at COP 7, but is not listed under Annex 
B of the Kyoto Protocol. 
c Turkey, an original member of OECD, did not ratify the Climate Convention before February 2004 
and is not listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.  
d These Parties are not members of the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
e Slovakia (2000), Poland (1996), Hungary (1996) and Czech Republic (1995) have all become 
members of OECD recently, but were already listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC from 1992. 
f Belarus is not listed under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
According to institutional membership (as referred to in Michaelowa et al. 2004), recent 
entries to the OECD and IEA should become members of Annex I and subject to absolute 
emissions targets. South Korea and Mexico are likely candidates for reduction commitments 
for a second commitment period.10  Malta and Cyprus that are ‘economies in transition’, but 
                                                     
9 The division between Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties has developed into a very rigid divide which 
has been further reinforced by the Kyoto Protocol which put emissions commitments for Annex I 
Parties only. 
10 “However, the two countries are expected to be pressured to participate in the reduction commitment 
for the second commitment period of 2013-17, as they are members of the Organization of the 
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new members of the EU from 2005 are other obvious candidates.  Michaelowa et al. (2004) 
propose that no least-developed countries (“recipients of IDA funds or food aid”) 11 be subject 
to any commitments, and that all OECD and IEA-members automatically be in stage 3.  
Pershing et al. (2004) propose to focus on the largest countries, for example the 5 or 25 
largest countries in terms of population, largest GDP, or largest emissions, see the illustration 
in figure 4. 
WRI
The top 25 overlap
S. Arabia
Top 25 in 
Emissions
Top 25 in 
Population Top 25 in GDP 
USA, China, EU25, 
Russia, India, Japan, 
Germany, Brazil, UK, 
Italy, Mexico, France, 
Indonesia, Iran, 
Turkey 
Ukraine, 
Pakistan
Canada,  
S.Korea,
Australia,
S.Africa,
Spain,
Poland,
Argentina
Netherlands, 
(Taiwan)Thailand
Bangladesh, 
Nigeria,    
Viet Nam, 
Philippines, 
Ethiopia,
Egypt, 
Congo
 
Source: Pershing et al. (2004). 
Figure 4. Overlap between top 25 countries in population, GDP, and emissions.  
2.3 Political feasibility 
Assessing the political feasibility of any mode of participation in a GHG-abatement regime 
will inevitably be based on an evaluation of what kind of commitment different countries are 
willing to accept in future negotiations. In other words, a negotiated agreement is the only 
way forward in the global handling of the climate change issue. Furthermore, an evaluation of 
possible future commitments must be based on the experience we already have with 
countries’ positions in previous rounds of negotiations. Positions have been fairly well 
established over the decade of negotiations that have passed, and our discussion is based on 
how different versions of a multi-stage regime (i.e. different thresholds and indicators for 
commitments) can help alter traditional positions enough to achieve a regime with broader 
participation. Our discussion is therefore founded on a discussion of differentiating 
responsibilities among countries in accordance with their ability and willingness to help 
mitigate anthropogenic global warming.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and have produced a large amount of emissions 
annually.” The Korea Times, 16. 12. 04. 
11 IDA: International Development Aid. 
CICERO Report 2005:02  
 Broadening the climate regime 
 
 
 
9
In our analysis, the various cases of the CR index provide an argument for using various 
criteria (equity, past/current/future responsibility etc.) to persuade certain developing 
countries or groups of developing countries, immediately or in the not-so-distant future, to 
accept being placed in specific stages and thereby be obliged to take on a specific or 
voluntary set of commitments. The core issue in the political feasibility assessment is 
therefore whether, how and which non-Annex I countries can be placed in stages 2 and 3. In 
particular, we find it pertinent to analyze how developing countries can become stronger 
participants in and contributors to a future regime.  
Applying standard assumptions of rationality, we make an underlying assessment based on 
who stands to gain or lose from a move of developing countries from stage 1 to stage 2. 
Industrialized countries will gain (or at least not lose) in the longer term, since a move of 
large and fast-growing developing countries into stage 2 would mean that they commit to 
reducing their emission intensity over time. A broader group of countries that address/reduce 
their emissions mean that the costs of mandatory reductions for industrialized Annex I 
countries will drop in the longer term. In order to achieve this desirable effect, i.e. to make a 
transfer from stage 1 to stage 2 politically feasible, industrialized countries must be willing to 
increase their transfer of funds and technology to developing countries – in particular 
increased funds for adaptation purposes. Increased transfers of funds and technology would 
potentially mean that developing countries could have a net gain (or at least not lose) by 
moving from stage 1 to stage 2. One challenge to this solution is that industrialized countries 
may not be sufficiently willing to substantially increase their engagement in transfer of money 
and technology from what they are already contributing. 
Furthermore, in previous rounds of negotiations the G77/China group has been acting as a 
remarkably unified coalition resisting any proposals from the Annex I group to accept any 
sort of commitments. Therefore, in our discussion of how various cases of the CR index can 
be applied as a tool to make developing countries accept a move from stage 1 to stage 2, we 
assume that developing countries are willing to let go of the negotiating power they have had 
during previous rounds by acting as a unified group. Underlying self-interests within 
G77/China are divergent, between groups representing preferences that vary from the low-
lying island states in AOSIS to the oil-exporting countries in OPEC. These differences in 
preferences may over time make it less likely that G77/China can continue acting as a unified 
negotiator. Hence, in this report, we argue that in a future regime developing countries must 
accept differentiation of commitments within the G77 if the regime is to move forward 
towards broader participation and stronger commitments. Since developing countries are 
predicted to suffer the worst impacts of climate change in the future, it would seem to be in 
their self-interest to achieve such a regime. In the following section, we assess various criteria 
and indicators for differentiation among developing countries in terms of what stage they 
belong to, and how these indicators can be a fruitful tool in future rounds of negotiations.  
3 Variations of the Capacity-Responsibility index 
In this section, we explore eight cases of the CR index (see table 3) to test their political 
feasibility in terms of grouping countries. In case 1, we reconstruct the CR index as in Criqui 
et al. (2003a) with the same threshold values, but for 184 countries instead of a regional basis. 
In case 2, we adjust the threshold values since case 1 shows significant differences between 
countries and within regions. Case 3 explores the option of including the countries’ level of 
development by adding the Human Development Index (HDI). Case 4 also uses the HDI, but 
by grouping the countries initially and not adding HDI to the CR index. Cases 5 through 8 
address the problem of adding two indicators of different nature by normalizing the 
indicators. Case 5 includes only income and emissions per capita, while case 6 also includes 
the HDI. Case 7 includes the dimension of governance in addition to income and emissions 
per capita. Case 8 builds on case 7, but adds an institutional affiliation requirement. 
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Table 3. Explored cases and characteristics 
Case Characteristics 
Case 1  Original CR index with original thresholds 
Case 2 Original CR index with adjusted thresholds  
Case 3 Original CR index + 10 HDI and adjusted thresholds 
Case 4 Original CR index with HDI values and adjusted thresholds 
Case 5 Normalized CR index and adjusted thresholds 
Case 6 Normalized CR index with HDI and adjusted thresholds  
Case 7 Normalized CR index with governance and adjusted thresholds  
Case 8 Normalized CR index with governance + institutional affiliation and adjusted thresholds 
3.1 Case 1: Original CR index with original thresholds 
We follow the methodology of Criqui et al. (2003a), but use data from the Climate Analysis 
Indicators Tool (CAIT) database.12 The difference in terms of the data is that while we both 
use per capita CO2 (t) equivalent emissions from 2000, Criqui et al. (2003a) use 1000 € per 
capita PPP from 1999 and we use 1000 $ per capita PPP from 2001.13 The resulting CR index 
values are only slightly higher than those specified in Criqui et al.’s analysis. In this first case, 
we therefore use the same graduation threshold values as Criqui et al., in that countries with a 
CR index value below 5 are in stage 1, countries with CR index values between 5 and 12 are 
in stage 2, and countries with CR index values higher than 12 are in stage 3.  
Table 4. Case 1 - Original CR index with original thresholds (5 and 12) 
Main countries in stage 1 
(CR<5) 
Main countries in stage 2 
(5<CR<12) 
Main countries in stage 3 
(CR>12) 
Annex I: (none) 
Oil-producing countries:  
Angola. Nigeria 
 
Others: 
Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, 
Vietnam, Honduras, Haiti, 
Kiribati, Bangladesh 
 
Annex I: Turkey, Romania 
Oil-producing countries: 
Iraq, Algeria 
 
Others:  
China, Philippines, 
Indonesia, Costa Rica, 
Peru, Bolivia, Namibia, 
Congo, Thailand, Egypt 
Annex I: (except two countries) 
Oil-producing countries:  
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Brunei, 
Equatorial Guinea, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Libya, Venezuela, Iran 
Others:  
Singapore, Israel, Cyprus, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Malta, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, South Africa, Botswana, Uruguay, 
Mongolia, Malaysia 
 
Table 4 presents the distribution of major countries across the three stages. Out of the 184 
countries, 72 countries accounting for about 65% of the global GHG emissions fall into stage 
3. All Annex I countries except Turkey and Romania fall into stage 3, but there are a number 
                                                     
12 CAIT is an information and analysis tool on global climate change developed by the World 
Resources Institute. CAIT provides a comprehensive and comparable database of greenhouse gas 
emissions data (including all major sources and sinks) and other climate-relevant indicators 
(http://cait.wri.org). 
 
13 Includes land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities. The CAIT database does 
include emissions from LULUCF activities, and global GHG emissions increase by about 22 percent 
when these emissions are included. We have chosen not to include LULUCF-related emissions since 
the CR-index is sensitive to such activities and their inclusion tends to penalize developing countries. If 
LULUCF activities were to somehow be included, the reference period should be longer (for instance 
10 years) and not based on one random year. 
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of non-Annex I countries that fall into the same stage. These are mainly oil-producing 
countries such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain, but also very different 
countries such as Israel, Argentina, Botswana, Chile, Mongolia and Brazil. Taiwan also falls 
in this stage. However, the country is not a party to the UNFCCC (and other UN-based 
agreements) since this has been blocked by China. In stage 2 (5<CR<12), we find 56 
countries accounting for about 25 percent of the global GHG emissions. Countries that fall 
into stage 2 are Romania, Turkey (both Annex I countries), Thailand, China, Peru, Egypt, 
Philippines and Indonesia. The remaining 56 countries accounting for about 10 percent of the 
global GHG emissions are placed in stage 1 (CR<5). Here we find countries such as India, 
Pakistan, Angola, Vietnam, Bangladesh and Nigeria. 
3.1.1 Political feasibility assessment 
A serious concern with the results in case 1 is the placement and grouping of countries in 
stage 3. In terms of political feasibility, it is vital that all Annex-I countries fall into in stage 3 
and take on reduction commitments. This is important to enable stronger commitments from 
developing countries. The results in table 4 show that some Annex I countries are placed in 
stage 2 due to their CR index values.  
Furthermore, some of the major oil-producing (and exporting) countries have high CR 
index values and therefore fall into stage 3 (see Table 4). This is a result not only from their 
large CO2-equivalent emissions per capita, but also from fairly high per capita incomes. It is, 
however, not likely that oil-exporting countries (that have a history of opposing GHG 
emission controls) would be willing to participate in stage 3 in the near future. The likelihood 
of transfer of funds and technology from industrialized countries in order to abate their 
potential loss of income as a result of lower petroleum exports is deemed low.  
Table 4 also shows that countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Botswana, South Africa, 
Mongolia, and Malaysia fall into stage 3. This is a problematic result, since it is highly 
unlikely that these countries would accept mandatory emissions reductions. It is a timely 
question to ask whether these countries would even accept a placement in stage 2.  If we take 
a look at the countries that are placed in stage 2, we find among others China, Indonesia and 
Thailand. Based on the previous positions of these countries in the negotiations, it is unlikely 
that at least China and Indonesia will accept any kind of commitments on their emissions, 
even if they got modest transfers as a return.  
Direct side-payments in the form of, for example, earmarked transfers could attract 
countries to move from stage 1 to stage 2 or from stage 2 to stage 3. This could speed up the 
graduation of key developing countries (like India and China) that according to our CR index 
(see Table 4) are currently close to graduating to a higher stage, or actually ripe for 
participation in stage 2 (India) or stage 3 (China). For instance, India has a CR index value of 
4.34. This means that the country is only 0.66 points away from graduating to stage 2. The 
composite nature of the CR index implies that this gap could translate into 660 kg CO2 
equivalents per capita or $660 per capita (or a mix of both). The CR index implicitly values 1 
additional ton CO2 equivalent per capita equal to an additional $1000 per capita. Although the 
per capita gap in monetary terms is small, India’s population of more than 1 billion 
potentially requires about $680 billion in transfers from industrialized countries to graduate 
into stage 2. Although such a side-payment could, for instance, be spread over 10 years and 
be tied to the condition that the side-payments are used for mitigation or adaptation measures, 
it is not likely to occur. On this background we find that adaptation transfers could be better 
handled through an adaptation protocol, see section 4. 
Our assessment of the results shows that there are several problems with applying the 
original CR index with original thresholds as a tool for future negotiations of a climate regime 
with broader participation. Countries that are clearly out of range of stage 3, according to an 
assessment based on positions in previous negotiations, fall within that stage when applying 
the index. The same feasibility problems also occur when the index indicates placement of 
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developing countries in stage 2. In particular it would be difficult to envision acceptance of 
graduation to stage 2 if not all Annex I countries fall into stage 3. 
To address these difficulties, we will in the next case (original CR index with adjusted 
thresholds) examine whether adjusting the original thresholds can make a difference in terms 
of grouping countries and whether this leads to improved political feasibility. 
3.2 Case 2: Original CR index with adjusted thresholds 
Criqui et al. (2003a)’s use of graduation levels 5 and 12 appears to be set in order to group on 
a regional basis. The lower threshold of 5 was chosen because as a result, all middle- and 
high-income non-Annex I regions would have some commitments. The threshold of 12 was 
chosen because a higher value would delay participation of the Middle East region and a 
lower value would imply immediate participation of the Central America and East Asia 
regions. In the previous section, we assessed the difficulties with such a result in terms of 
political feasibility.  
Although calculating CR index values for all countries makes the grouping of countries 
more complicated, it could produce some valuable results for analytic purposes. As case 1 
shows, there are significant variations within and between regions in terms of the CR index 
values. In case 2, we therefore examine whether the threshold values can be adjusted (to 8 and 
14) to change the grouping of countries and possibly improve the political feasibility. 
Table 5 presents the distribution of major countries across the three stages. With the new 
threshold values of 8 and 14, minor changes are observed compared to the ‘original’ 
thresholds of 5 and 12. A total of 65 countries accounting for about 61% of the total 
emissions now fall into stage 3. Seven countries that were in stage 3 are now in stage 2. These 
seven countries are Lithuania, Mauritius, Iran, Belarus, Mongolia, Latvia and Brazil. The 
‘new’ stage 2 will include 37 countries accounting for 24% of the total emissions. Adjusting 
the lower threshold from 5 to 8 adds 26 countries to stage 1 where the countries have no 
emission reduction commitments. This group totals 82 countries accounting for 15% of total 
emissions. Interesting countries that move from stage 2 to stage 1 are Peru, Bolivia, Iraq, 
Egypt, Philippines and Indonesia.   
Table 5. Case 2 - Original CR index with adjusted thresholds  
Main countries in stage 1 
(CR<8) 
Main countries in stage 2 
(8<CR<14) 
Main countries in stage 3 
(CR>14) 
Annex I: 
 
Oil-producing countries:  
Iraq, Angola, Nigeria 
 
Others:  
Peru, Bolivia, Egypt, 
Philippines, Indonesia,  India, 
Pakistan, Vietnam, Bangladesh,  
Annex I: (Lithuania, Belarus, 
Latvia, Turkey, Romania) 
Oil-producing countries:  
Iran, Algeria 
 
Others: 
Mauritius, Mongolia, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, China, Namibia, 
Congo, Thailand  
Annex I: (except 5 countries) 
 
Oil-producing countries: Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Brunei, 
Equatorial Guinea, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Libya, Venezuela 
Others:  
Singapore, Israel, Cyprus, Taiwan, 
South Korea, Malta, Mexico, 
Argentina, Chile, South Africa, 
Botswana, Uruguay, Malaysia 
3.2.1 Political feasibility assessment 
Most of the issues raised in terms of political feasibility under case 1 are also relevant in this 
case. Additional Annex I countries fall into stage 2, while many of the oil-producing countries 
are still placed in stage 3. Other non-Annex I countries are spread over all three stages. It is 
clear that adjusting the CR threshold values is not sufficient to significantly improve the 
political feasibility and that additional variations are required.   
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Having concluded that the original CR index with original and adjusted thresholds has only 
limited value for our analytical purposes, we acknowledge that we need to move on to include 
other indicators to get to a more feasible tool for discussing broader participation in a future 
regime. 
3.3 Case 3: Original CR index including HDI indicator and adjusted 
thresholds 
The original CR index may not adequately reflect the countries’ capacity to implement 
mitigation (and adaptation) measures. The human development index (HDI) is commonly 
used to assess, rank and group countries in terms of their welfare and/or development. The 
HDI indicator could be included using various approaches. Simply adding the HDI indicator 
to the original CR index would lead to little change in the CR index values and hence the 
grouping of countries because the HDI ranges from 0.273 in Sierra Leone to 0.956 in Norway 
in 2002. Another approach could be to adjust the original CR index values by multiplying by 
the countries’ HDI indicator value. This approach would, however, not give HDI too much 
equal weight compared to the two other indicators. In order to give the HDI about equal 
weight compared to the two indicators already in the CR index, the CR index is adjusted by 
adding 10 times the HDI to the original CR index. This is because the average values for each 
of the three indicators are then 6.4 for tons CO2 equivalent per capita, 8.6 for $1000 intl. per 
capita and 6.8 for the HDI.14 The adjusted CR index will, by adding 10 times the HDI, range 
from 102 for Qatar to 4 for Sierra Leone. Since another indicator has been added, the 
thresholds for graduation must be changed (in this case to 15 and 28). 
Table 6. Case 3 - Original CR index + 10 HDI and adjusted thresholds 
 
Table 6 presents the distribution of major countries across the three stages. Forty-nine 
countries accounting for about 54% of the GHG emissions fall into stage 3. Several non-
Annex I countries fall into stage 3. Examples are eight oil-producing countries and countries 
such as Singapore, Israel, Antigua & Barbuda, Taiwan, South Korea and Argentina. Stage 2 
consists of 52 countries accounting for 31% of the GHG emissions. In addition to Romania 
and Turkey that also in earlier cases fell into stage 2, a number of additional Annex I 
                                                     
14 The Human Development Report provides the HDI for a total of 177 countries. It therefore does not 
provide the HDI for all countries in the CAIT database. For the purpose of this report, we therefore 
assign HDI values to the countries that have no HDI value in the Human Development report. For 
Taiwan, a HDI of 0.902 is chosen (http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20040811/20040811b1.html). 
For Afghanistan, Cook Island, Iraq, Kiribati, North Korea, Liberia, Nauru, Niue, Palau and Serbia & 
Montenegro, the HDI is set equal to the lowest HDI available, 0.273. 
Main countries in stage 1 
(CR<15) 
Main countries in stage 2 
(15<CR<28) 
Main countries in stage 3 
(CR>28) 
Annex I: (none) 
 
Oil-producing countries: 
Iraq, Angola, Nigeria 
 
Others:  
Philippines, North Korea, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh  
 
Annex I: (Croatia, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Belarus, 
Latvia, Romania and Turkey) 
Oil-producing countries: 
Libya, Venezuela, Iran 
 
Others:  
South Africa, , Kazakhstan, 
Mexico, Brazil, Thailand, 
Colombia, China 
Annex I: (except 8 countries) 
 
Oil-producing countries:  
Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Equatorial Guinea, Saudi Arabia, 
Oman, Libya, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Others:  
Singapore, Israel, Antigua & 
Barbuda, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Malta, 
Argentina, South Africa, Mexico 
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countries now fall into stage 2. These are Croatia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Belarus and 
Latvia. Other important countries are South Africa, Libya, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Mexico, 
Iran, Brazil, Thailand, Colombia and China. The remaining 83 countries accounting for about 
15% of the global GHG emissions are placed in stage 1. Here we find countries such as 
Philippines, North Korea, Egypt, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Angola, 
Bangladesh and Nigeria. 
3.3.1 Political feasibility assessment 
Does the distribution of commitments indicated by the CR index become politically more 
feasible by taking the HDI factor into account? Such an assessment will naturally depend on 
how the graduation thresholds are set, but 15 and 28 have been selected in order to be 
comparable with the earlier cases. The inclusion of the HDI indicator enables the CR index to 
reflect the various countries’ level of development. This makes the CR index a better tool for 
distinguishing between countries, particularly within the G77/China group. It suggests 
graduation to a higher stage for countries with a high or medium level of development, and 
not for countries with a low level of development. Examples of countries that have a higher 
ranking than in the cases without the inclusion of the HDI factor are Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cuba, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Nigeria. Examples of countries that 
receive a lower ranking than before include Iraq, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, Congo, 
Swaziland, Guinea and Angola. As such, this version of the CR index can be a valuable tool 
in future negotiations in terms of pinpointing differences between developing countries. In 
particular, it can help illustrate that some developing countries are riper for taking on 
commitments than others. However, the problems persist that it is unlikely (in terms of 
political feasibility, and based on experience from previous negotiations) that the G77/China 
will accept differentiation within the group, or indeed any commitments to reduce their 
emissions before industrialized countries have shown substantial progress.  
Furthermore, this case of the CR index indicates only minor changes in terms of placement 
and ranking of the top-50 countries (CR>28). This is because their HDI values differ only 
slightly. Thus, there are still difficulties with some Annex I countries falling into stage 2 
while some major oil-producing countries and other non-Annex I countries fall into stage 3.  
Although the HDI factor helps to distinguish between countries in terms of their level of 
development, this case does not substantially improve the analytical tool. Another drawback 
is that the HDI is partly based on the GDP per capita (PPP) in each country, an indicator 
which is already in the CR index. However, one could, as the next case shows, use the HDI in 
a different format to improve analytical features and political feasibility. 
3.4 Case 4: Original CR index with HDI values and adjusted thresholds 
Simply adding ten times the HDI to the original CR index did little to help a politically 
feasible grouping of countries into different stages of commitments. However, it is still 
desirable to somehow use the HDI to group countries. This case therefore takes the HDI 
values of the countries as a starting point to group countries and combines this with the 
original CR index.  
The Human Development Report places all countries into three different groups, namely 
high human development, medium human development and low human development. The 
high human development group consists of 55 countries with a HDI of 0.8 or above. Here we 
find most Annex I countries and the most developed non-Annex I countries. It is notable that 
the oil-producing countries do not rank highly within this group, and that some of these 
countries are not in the high human development group at all. The CR index values for the 
countries in this group range from 93.65 to 6.76. The medium development group consists of 
86 countries with a HDI between 0.5 and 0.8 and a CR index value between 32.55 and 1.71. 
The Annex I countries Russia, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine are found here, along with 
interesting countries such as Malaysia, Brazil, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Philippines, Turkey, 
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China and India. The remaining 36 countries are placed in the low human development group 
and all have a HDI below 0.5. The most interesting countries in this group are Pakistan and 
Nigeria. With the exception of Congo and Mauritania, all countries have CR index values 
below 5. 
This variant of the CR index in combination with the HDI values, groups the countries into 
the three stages according to the following criteria:15 
Stage 3: HDI > 0.5 and CR > 20. 
Stage 2: HDI > 0.5 and 8 < CR < 20. 
Stage 1: HDI < 0.8 and CR < 8, or HDI < 0.5.  
 
Table 7 presents the distribution of major countries across the three stages. Forty-nine 
countries accounting for about 54% of the GHG emissions fall into stage 3. Several non-
Annex I countries fall into stage 3. Examples are again oil-producing countries such as Qatar, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and countries such as Singapore, Cyprus, Bahamas and Argentina. 
Stage 2 consists of 49 countries accounting for 31% of the GHG emissions. Here we find no 
less than 8 Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries such as Malaysia, Mexico, Brazil 
and China. The remaining 87 countries accounting for about 15% of the global GHG 
emissions are placed in stage 1. Here we find countries such as Iraq, Indonesia, India, 
Vietnam and Nigeria. 
Table 7. Case 4 – Original CR index with HDI values and adjusted thresholds 
Main countries in stage 1 
(HDI<0.8 and CR<8) 
Main countries in stage 2 
(0.5<HDI and 8<CR<20) 
Main countries in stage 3 
(HDI>0.5 and CR>20) 
Annex I: (none) 
 
Oil-producing countries:  
Iraq, Angola, Nigeria 
 
Others:  
Philippines, Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, India, Pakistan, 
Vietnam, Bangladesh 
 
Annex I: Croatia, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Belarus, 
Latvia and Romania 
Oil-producing countries: 
Libya, Venezuela, Iran 
 
Others: 
South Africa, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, 
Thailand and China 
Annex I: (except 7 countries) 
Oil-producing countries:  
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Brunei, 
Equatorial Guinea, Saudi Arabia, 
Oman, Trinidad & Tobago 
Others: 
Singapore, Israel, Antigua & 
Barbuda, Cyprus, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Malta, Bahamas, Barbados 
and Argentina 
 
3.4.1 Political feasibility assessment 
This case avoids one of the drawbacks from the previous case in that ‘double-counting’ is 
now avoided since the HDI factor is not directly incorporated into the CR index. Still, many 
of the same issues raised in the assessment of cases 1–3 also apply here. This case can first 
and foremost be a useful tool for distinguishing between countries, particularly within the 
G77+China group, and even more strongly than case 3 emphasizes the need for distinguishing 
between countries based on their degree of development. It suggests graduation to a higher 
stage for countries with a high or medium level of development, and not for countries with a 
low level of development. The index hence pinpoints differences between developing 
countries, and can be used as a tool to illustrate that some developing countries have a degree 
of development that can more easily accommodate taking on commitments than others. 
                                                     
15 The only country that does not fit these criteria is Cuba with a HDI of 0.809 and a CR of 6.76. Due 
to its low CR value, Cuba is placed in stage 1. 
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The original CR index has produced problematic results in cases 1–4. In order to improve 
our analytical tool, therefore, it seems necessary not only add indicators to the original CR 
index, but also to adjust the CR index itself. This is our approach in the following case. 
3.5 Case 5: Normalized CR index 
The CR index as applied in cases 1–4 combines two indicators of different nature. GDP per 
capita is given more weight since the level of variance is larger for the capability indicator 
(between the countries on GDP per capita) than for on the responsibility indicator (emissions 
per capita). The average values for each of these indicators are then 6.4 for tons CO2 
equivalent per capita and 8.6 for $1000 per capita PPP. The CR index could be made more 
reliable through normalization.16 In comparison to the original CR index, a normalized CR 
index would give a relatively higher emphasis on responsibility (emissions per capita) 
because the average value of income is substantially higher. When the two variables are 
normalized, they are given equal weight, and not just added together as in case 1. This is what 
we aim to examine in case 5. 
Based on data from CAIT database, an index of two normalized indicators representing 
responsibility (yearly emissions per capita) and capacity (income per capita) gave slightly 
different results than the original CR index.  
Table 8. Case 5 - Normalized CR index 
Main countries in stage 1 
(CR<10) 
Main countries in stage 2 
(10<CR<20) 
Main countries in stage 3 
(CR>20) 
Annex I:(Romania, 
Turkey) 
Oil-producing countries: 
Angola, Nigeria  
Others:  
Costa Rica, Thailand, 
China, Egypt, Philippines, 
Indonesia, India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh 
Annex I: (Slovakia, Russian Fed., 
Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Ukraine, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Belarus, Latvia) 
Oil-producing countries: 
Venezuela, Libya, Iran 
Others: 
Malta, South Africa, Argentina, 
Nauru, Botswana, Malaysia, 
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Brazil 
Annex I: (except 10 countries) 
Oil-producing countries:  
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Brunei, 
Trinidad & Tobago, Saudi 
Arabia, Oman  
Others: 
Singapore, Israel, Cyprus, 
Taiwan, South Korea 
 
Table 8 presents the distribution of major countries across the three stages. In particular, oil 
producing (and exporting) countries score high(er) on this normalized index than on the CR 
index. Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Brunei, Saudi-Arabia, Equatorial 
Guinea, Oman and Trinidad & Tobago have all a CR index value of above 20, which is set as 
the threshold for participation in stage 3. Also a number of “industrialized developing 
countries” such as Singapore, Israel, Cyprus, Taiwan and South Korea are other non-Annex I 
Parties that score above 20. (Malta, the new EU entry, comes close). The next group includes 
South Africa, Argentina, Botswana, Malaysia, Kazakhstan and Venezuela, but also Annex I 
Parties such as Slovakia, Russian Fed., Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Belarus, and Latvia. They have all a score above 10. Mexico, Costa Rica and 
Brazil and Iran score also higher than 10 on the index. The two Annex I Parties Rumania and 
Turkey have even a lower score and are according to this index placed in stage 1. China has a 
score of only 6.5 and is ranked 102nd, while India has a score of 3.5 and is ranked 136th. All 
LDCs and most west and east African countries have very low scores.  
                                                     
16 For each indicator (and country), an index is calculated using the following formula: 100 x ((actual 
value - minimum value) / (maximum value-minimum value)). Hence, each indicator’s index ranges 
from 0 to 100.  
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Out of the 184 countries, 42 countries accounting for about 46% of the global GHG 
emissions fall into stage 3. In general, the Annex I countries fall into stage 3, but twelve of 
them do not. The non-Annex I countries that fall into the same stage are mainly oil-producing 
countries such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Brunei and Saudi, Arabia, 
but also Singapore, Israel, Cyprus, Taiwan, and South Korea. In stage 2 (10<CR<20), we find 
30 countries accounting for about 19% of the global GHG emissions. Countries that fall into 
stage 2 are ten economies in transition (Annex I countries), Malta, Venezuela, South Africa, 
Botswana, Malaysia, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Iran. The remaining 114 countries 
accounting for about 35% of the global GHG emissions are placed in stage 1 (CR<10). Here 
we find the Annex I countries Romania, Turkey, and countries such as Costa Rica, Thailand, 
China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Angola, Bangladesh and Nigeria. 
3.5.1 Political feasibility assessment 
Most of the same issues in terms of political feasibility discussed for cases 1 and 2 also apply 
here. In fact, some results are even more problematic, since more Annex I countries are 
excluded from stage 3, which would probably lead to less willingness from G77 countries to 
move from stage 1 to 2. Furthermore, an important non-Annex I country like China has fallen 
into stage 1. These results clearly call for a refinement of the normalized CR index. One way 
of doing this is to include other indicators. This is our task in case 6.  
3.6 Case 6: Normalized CR index with HDI  
Cases 3 and 4 showed that although including HDI in the original CR index does not result in 
a politically feasible grouping of countries, it was a useful tool for distinguishing between 
countries within the G77/China group. This case therefore examines whether including the 
HDI into the normalized CR index can yield similarly interesting results. As in case 5 we 
create a normalized CR index, but in this case it is based on three indicators: yearly emissions 
per capita, income per capita and the HDI index. The three normalized indicators are then 
added and divided by three to produce a CR index that theoretically could range from 0 to 
100, but which in practice ranges from 0.62 to 76.1. The CR index values of most countries 
increase, so the threshold values are set relatively high at 25 and 35. 
Table 9. Case 6 - Normalized CR index with HDI 
Main countries in stage 1 
(CR<25) 
Main countries in stage 2 
(25<CR<35) 
Main countries in stage 3 
(CR>35) 
Annex I: (none) 
 
 
 
Oil-producing countries: 
Nigeria, Angola 
Others:  
Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, 
India, Bangladesh,  
 
 
Annex I: (Latvia, Bulgaria, 
Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, 
Turkey) 
Oil-producing countries: Libya, 
Venezuela, Iran 
Others: 
Botswana, Malaysia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Kazakhstan, Brazil, 
Thailand, Colombia, South Africa, 
China, Philippines 
 
Annex I: (except 6 countries) 
Oil-producing countries: Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Brunei, Bahrain, Equatorial Guinea, 
Saudi-Arabia, Oman, Trinidad & 
Tobago, 
Others: 
Singapore, Israel, Taiwan, Cyprus, 
South Korea, Malta, Antigua 
&Barbuda, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Chile 
 
Table 9 presents the distribution of major countries across the three stages. Fifty-four 
countries accounting for about 55% of the global GHG emissions fall into stage 3 (CR>35). 
In general, the Annex I countries tend to fall into stage 3, with five or six exceptions. The 
non-Annex I countries that fall into the same stage are mainly nine oil-producing countries 
such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Brunei and Saudi-Arabia, but also countries 
such as Singapore, Israel, Taiwan, Cyprus, South Korea, Malta, Argentina and Chile. In stage 
2 (35<CR<25), we find 58 countries accounting for about 31% of the global GHG emissions. 
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Countries that fall into stage 2 are six Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries such as 
Libya, Venezuela, Malaysia, Mexico, Brazil, Iran, China and the Philippines. The remaining 
72 countries, all non-Annex I countries and accounting for about 14% of the global GHG 
emissions are placed in stage 1 (CR<25). Here we find countries such as Nigeria, Angola, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, India and Bangladesh.  
3.6.1 Political feasibility assessment 
This case seems to be better than case 5 since no Annex I countries qualify for stage 1 and 
only a few qualify for stage 2. However, since the HDI has been normalized, it does not 
distinguish much between countries. All CR index values increase, with the exception of 
those countries with a HDI set to 0.273 (see footnote 6). Oil producing and exporting 
countries typically do not increase their CR index values as much as most countries in stages 
3 and 2. But most of these countries still score high and are thus placed in stage 3. A number 
of “industrialized” non-Annex I countries such as Singapore, Israel, Cyprus, Taiwan and 
South Korea also score high and are placed in the same stage along with countries such as 
Argentina and Chile.   
Cases 3 and 4 to some extent benefited from including the HDI factor in that it helped to 
distinguish between countries in terms of their level of development. The ability to 
distinguish between countries is not evident in case 6, and therefore it does not substantially 
improve the analytical tool. Further developments are required, and the following case 
examines including the dimension of governance. 
3.7 Case 7: Normalized CR index with governance 
A different option to further develop the normalized index developed in case 5 is to include 
the dimension of governance, which illustrates the ability to implement and follow up 
commitments. By using the normalized CR index from case 5 in addition to an index of 
governance from CAIT, we developed a normalized index of three selected indicators 
representing responsibility (yearly emissions per capita), capacity (income per capita and 
governance) and governance. Compared to the results from case 5, the main difference by 
using this indicator is that most of the oil producing/exporting countries have substantially 
lower scores. However, this index distinguishes between Parties within the Annex I group as 
well. As many as twelve Annex I Parties are not in stage 3. 
Table 10. Case 7 - Normalized CR index with governance 
 Main countries in stage 1 
(CR<25) 
Main countries in stage 2 
(25<CR<35) 
Main countries in stage 3 
(CR>35) 
Annex I: (Ukraine, Belarus, 
Turkey) 
Oil-producing countries: 
Venezuela, Libya, Angola, 
Nigeria  
Others:  
China, India, Egypt, Iran, 
Philippines, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh 
Annex I: (Slovakia, Russian Fed., 
Hungary, Poland, Croatia, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania 
Latvia) 
Oil-producing countries: Saudi-
Arabia 
Others: 
Uruguay, Botswana, South Africa, 
Costa Rica, Argentina, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Mexico, and Brazil  
Annex I: (except 12 countries) 
 
Oil-producing countries: Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Brunei, Oman, Trinidad 
& Tobago 
Others:  
South Korea, Singapore, Malta, 
Cyprus, Israel, Chile 
 
Table 10 presents the distribution of major countries across the three stages. Out of the 184 
countries, 42 countries accounting for about 45% of the global GHG emissions fall into stage 
3. Most Annex I countries fall into stage 3, but eleven of them do not and among them three 
are in stage 1. Some oil-producing countries such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, and Brunei are still in stage 3, but Saudi-Arabia is relegated from stage 3 to stage 2. 
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South Korea, Singapore, Malta, Cyprus, Israel and Chile are in stage 3. Malta is promoted 
from stage 2 in case 5 to stage 3 here. In stage 2 (35<CR<20), we find only 23 countries 
accounting for about barely 10% of the global GHG emissions. Countries that fall into stage 2 
are nine economies in transition (Annex I countries), Uruguay, Botswana, South Africa, and 
Costa Rica. Romania and Thailand are promoted from stage 1 to stage 2. The remaining 119 
countries accounting for about 45% of the global GHG emissions are placed in stage 1 
(CR<25). Here we find the Annex I countries Ukraine, Belarus and Turkey. Ukraine, Belarus, 
Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Libya have all been relegated from stage 2 to stage 1. 
Countries such as China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Angola, Bangladesh and Nigeria are still 
in stage 1, but it is interesting that India and China receive the same score and that the 
threshold for stage 2 perhaps should be lowered to ensure a more even distribution.  
Even though 31 countries do not have a value on the governance variable, they account for 
only 0.8 % of the global emissions. Taiwan is by far the most important party in this group 
since it accounts for 0.6 % of the global emissions.  
3.7.1 Political feasibility assessment 
A major problem with including this governance indicator is that totalitarian countries, such 
as Ukraine and Belarus, are put in an early stage and may thereby receive less strict climate 
commitments. This indicator would therefore reward countries with non-democratic 
governance in terms of allowing them less strict commitments. Compared to case 5, Malta is 
then promoted from stage 2 to stage 3, while Romania and Thailand are promoted from stage 
1 to stage 2. Ukraine, Belarus, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Libya are relegated from 
stage 2 to stage 1, and Saudi-Arabia is relegated from stage 3 to stage 2.  
Furthermore, most of the same problems found in cases 1 and 2 apply to this index when it 
comes to political feasibility. An advantage with this index is that it refines the results we 
found in cases 3 and 4, and gives a new angle to differentiation between countries within the 
G77.  
The major concern in this case is that a number of Annex I countries are placed in stages 1 
and 2. Non-Annex I countries are not likely to accept such an outcome, and they are likely to 
demand that current Annex I countries must be placed in stage 3. In our final case, we 
therefore build on case 7, but add a dimension of institutional affiliation. 
3.8 Case 8: Normalized CR index with governance plus institutional 
affiliation 
Case 7 was promising in that major non-Annex I countries were mostly placed in stages 1 
and 2. However, a number of Annex I countries were placed in stage 1 and 2. The political 
feasibility assessment concluded that non-Annex I countries will not accept that Annex I 
countries are spread out over all three stages. This indicates that simple criteria are not 
flexible enough to cover the significantly different circumstances in the countries of the 
world. In this case, we therefore impose an institutional affiliation requirement. This requires 
all Annex I countries to be placed in stage 3. In addition, Cyprus and Malta are also placed in 
stage 3 due to their inclusion in the EU. Mexico and South Korea are also placed in stage 3 
due to their membership in the OECD. Countries that over time become members of either 
Annex I or the OECD would also be placed in stage 3. The CR thresholds are adjusted from 
case 7 in order to involve some major non-Annex I countries in stage 2.  
Table 11 presents the distribution of major countries across the three stages. Fifty-two 
countries accounting for about 57% of the global GHG emissions fall into stage 3. All Annex 
I countries are now placed in stage 3, along with the new EU countries Malta and Cyprus, and 
South Korea and Mexico which are OECD member countries, but not Annex I countries. 
Several oil-producing countries such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and 
Brunei are still in stage 3, but Saudi-Arabia is in stage 2. Singapore, Israel and Trinidad & 
Tobago are also in stage 3. By lowering the threshold of graduation from stage 1 to stage 2, 
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we now have 37 countries accounting for about 32% of the global GHG emissions. Countries 
that fall into stage 2 are Chile, Uruguay, Botswana, Costa Rica, South Africa, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, China, Philippines and India. The remaining 95 countries 
accounting for about 11% of the global GHG emissions are placed in stage 1 (CR<20). Here 
we find countries such as Libya, Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh.  
Table 11. Case 8 - Indexed Normalized CR index with governance plus institutional affiliation 
Main countries in stage 1 
(CR<20) 
Main countries in stage 2 
(20<CR<36) 
Main countries in stage 3 
(CR>36) 
Annex I: (none) 
Oil-producing countries:,  
Libya, Angola, Nigeria  
Others: 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh 
 
Annex I: (none) 
Oil-producing countries:  
Saudi-Arabia, Venezuela 
Others: 
Chile, Uruguay, Botswana, Costa 
Rica, Argentina, South Africa, 
Malaysia, Thailand,  Brazil, Egypt, 
Iran, China, Philippines, India. 
Annex I: (all) 
Oil-producing countries:  
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Brunei, Oman, 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Others:  
South Korea, Mexico, Cyprus, 
Malta, Singapore, Israel,  
 
3.8.1 Political feasibility assessment 
The issue raised in earlier cases concerning Annex I countries being placed in stages 1 and 2 
is in this case resolved by requiring all Annex I countries to be placed in stage 3. This 
combined with the inclusion of Cyprus, Malta, South Korea and Mexico in stage 3 should 
satisfy the demand of the G77/China group that the developed countries take the lead in 
controlling GHG emissions. The case of some major oil producing and exporting countries 
being placed in stage 3 is not resolved, but this is largely due to their characteristics of high 
incomes and emissions per capita. In terms of other non-Annex I countries, this case seems 
more promising than the earlier cases, in that fewer are placed in stage 3, and that it allows for 
more differentiation between countries within the G77.  
3.9 Conclusion 
Successful future climate policy commitments rely on developing stronger commitments for 
the Annex I Parties and broadening the participation from non-Annex I Parties. Countries’ 
positions in previous rounds of negotiations are fairly well established over the decade of 
negotiations that have passed, but a multi-stage regime building on a CR index could help 
alter traditional positions enough to achieve a regime with broader participation.  
The eight CR index cases have explored various criteria and indicators for differentiation 
among countries, and how these indexes can be a fruitful tool in future rounds of negotiations. 
Table 12 presents the results from the various cases in terms of how certain non-Annex I 
countries are placed in stages 1 to 3. In addition, figure 5 shows the distribution in terms of 
GHG emissions across the three stages for all cases. 
Table A.1 in the Annex shows CR results for all countries in cases 1, 3 and 7. Case 1 is 
included as a reference that is close to the original CR. Case 3 is included to illustrate the 
effect of including the HDI indicator. Case 4 has the same CR values as case 1 since HDI is 
only used for grouping countries initially. Case 7 is close to case 8, the difference being that 
Annex I countries are forced to be in stage 3 in the latter case.  
In case 1, a small share of global GHG emissions are found in stage 1. This could indicate 
that the original thresholds were set too low. The adjusted thresholds in stage 2 did however, 
only slightly change the distribution. As for the remaining six cases, the choice of indicators, 
but mainly the threshold values determine the distribution of commitments. Taking country 
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concerns into account, a careful balance will be needed to ensure meaningful and sufficient 
participation across countries. 
Table 12. Placement of important or interesting non-Annex I countries in the various cases 
Country Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 
Qatar 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
UAE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Kuwait 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Bahrain 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Brunei  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Singapore 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Thailand  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Philippines  2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 
Cyprus  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Malta  3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 
Saudi Arabia  3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 
Taiwan  3 3 3 3 3 n.a.17 n.a. n.a. 
South Korea  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Argentina  3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 
South Africa  3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Libya  3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Botswana  3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Uruguay  3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 
Malaysia  3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Venezuela  3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 
Chile  3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 
Mexico  3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Iran  3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
Brazil  3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
South Korea  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
China  2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 
India  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
 
The detailed assessment under each case shows that each presents some difficulties in terms 
of political feasibility. A major concern in cases 1–7 is that some Annex I countries qualify 
for one or two stages with less commitments than they currently have. If this is the case, non-
Annex I countries are not likely to accept any commitments. Case 8 meets this concern by 
                                                     
17 Taiwan is not included in CAIT’s governance index. However, Taiwan is a prosperous and 
democratic country which is close to Annex I countries and should be one of the first non-Annex I 
countries to enter stage 3.  
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requiring all current Annex I countries, along with new EU member countries Cyprus and 
Malta and the OECD members South Korea and Mexico to automatically qualify for stage 3. 
The core issues in the political feasibility assessments have therefore been how the most 
developed non-Annex I countries can be placed in stages 2 and 3 and which countries this 
would be.  
Major oil-producing (and exporting) countries have high CR index values and therefore 
often fall into stages 3 and 2. This is a result not only from their large CO2-equivalent 
emissions per capita, but also from fairly high per capita incomes. It is, however, not likely 
that many oil-exporting countries (that have a history of opposing GHG emission controls) 
would be willing to participate in stage 3 in the near future. Various other large non-Annex I 
countries qualify for stage 3 in some of the cases. This is an interesting result, but it still 
seems highly unlikely that these countries would accept mandatory emissions reductions. It is 
a timely question to ask whether these countries would even accept a placement in stage 2.  
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Figure 5. Share of global GHG emissions by stages in the various cases 
 
Based on the previous positions of the G77/China group, it may be unlikely that countries 
within this group will accept any kind of commitments on their emissions. However, the 
analysis shows that there are significant differences between countries in this group in terms 
of responsibility and capability. Some sort of differentiation of commitments within the 
G77/China group will therefore be needed to move forward towards broader participation and 
stronger commitments. The CR index has its limitations for grouping all countries. However, 
by including indicators such as the HDI and governance, it can first and foremost be a useful 
tool for distinguishing between countries, particularly within the G77/China group. In this 
way, it emphasizes the need for distinguishing between countries based on their degree of 
development and governance.  
Direct side-payments in the form of, for example, earmarked transfers as a way to attract 
countries to move from stage 1 to stage 2, or from stage 2 to stage 3, are unlikely to succeed. 
Even modest transfers purely to engage some countries are less likely, but the issue of 
transfers could be handled through an adaptation protocol (see the following section). 
CICERO Report 2005:02  
 Broadening the climate regime 
 
 
 
23
4 Adaptation and mitigation: an adaptation protocol as a 
supplement to a multi-stage agreement 
Based on the analysis in section 3, we believe that increased funding of adaptation to climate 
change in developing countries would be difficult to link directly to differentiation of 
commitments in a multi-stage climate regime. The criteria of responsibility for past emissions 
and the ability and willingness to take on commitments do not easily combine with the 
complex issues regarding vulnerability to climate change, and need and ability to adapt. Even 
so, in the international negotiations it has become an increasingly strong demand from 
developing countries that adaptation be put higher on the agenda. Currently, funding for 
adaptation purposes established in the Kyoto Protocol is channeled through three specific 
financial mechanisms: The Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund in which the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) is requested to disburse funds for the preparation of National 
Adaptation Programs for Action (NAPAs); the Special Climate Change Fund, also operated 
by GEF to finance adaptation, technology transfer and mitigation measures; and the Kyoto 
Protocol Adaptation Fund to support adaptation projects and programs in developing 
countries that are Parties to the Protocol. The latter fund is to be financed by a levy on CDM 
projects (Huq and Burton 2003), while contributions to the LDC Fund and the Special 
Climate Change Fund are to be voluntary (Adger et al. 2003). Developing countries demand 
that these and additional financial mechanisms for adaptation be applied more effectively and 
in accordance with local priorities in the future. The worries of industrialized countries if 
local priorities are given more weight are that funds originally earmarked for adaptation 
purposes can be used merely as increased ODA funds, i.e. for development purposes, rather 
than as climate change measures. 
The effects of climate change are predicted to be hardest in the regions of the world where 
the poorest countries and people are located. Developing countries are more vulnerable to 
climate change and hence face tougher challenges when it comes to adaptation as a result of 
four key factors: First, many are dependent on agriculture and natural resources; second, some 
are dependent on fossil fuel exports; third, many have weak institutions and governance; and 
fourth, many are located in climatic zones and geographical positions that will experience 
particularly strong impacts of climate change.  
In a future multi-stage climate agreement, adaptation could play a larger role than it has 
done in earlier agreements. The UNFCCC (Article 4) clearly states that it is the responsibility 
of developed countries to support developing countries in their adaptation to the negative 
consequences of climate change. We suggest that the solution is to negotiate an adaptation 
protocol as a complement to the multi-stage regime that is focused on mitigation issues. We 
argue that it is possible to expand the room for participation for developing countries in stages 
2 or 3 (see section 3) by adding an adaptation protocol.  
The core question here would be: How can an adaptation protocol be designed to ensure 
increased participation? As in section 3, our main concern is to analyze how differentiation 
between developing countries in terms of ability and responsibility can be used as a tool in 
future negotiations to group the countries differently. As such, vulnerability to climate change 
and ability to cope and adapt to changes differ among developing countries. It is the poorest 
people among the poor countries that stand to be hardest affected by global warming, and it is 
also inhabitants of these countries that have least resources and capabilities to respond 
effectively.  
Hence, an adaptation protocol included in a multi-stage regime should be designed to 
secure transfer of funds and technology to countries that are most vulnerable in terms of 
impacts and ability to cope. The rules for financing must be agreed on in a negotiated 
agreement to enhance political feasibility. An important issue to settle is whether it is 
necessary to establish additional financial mechanisms (funds), or whether a transfer of the 
existing Adaptation Funds from the Kyoto Protocol is sufficient. In terms of identifying the 
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most vulnerable recipients, our case 4 in section 3 pointed out one possible way to group 
countries according to a combination of the CR index and HDI, which could be a useful 
indicator to determine distribution of transfers in an additional adaptation protocol. If these 
transfers were earmarked for policies and measures that would lead the recipient country’s 
development path in the direction of sustainable development (i.e. a low-emission society 
with capacity to adapt), adaptation transfers within a protocol could in fact become a tool to 
graduate developing countries from stage 1 to stage 2, and eventually even to stage 3.  
The cooperation between Annex I and developing countries in terms of preparing for, 
planning for, and facilitating the implementation of adaptation measures is probably more 
politically feasible if rules for synergy with flexibility mechanisms (CDM and JI) and other 
mitigation policy instruments are developed. The specifics of how these rules should be 
designed are beyond the scope of this report.18 It suffices to point out that when it comes to 
political feasibility, several distinct and difficult issues have to be addressed when discussing 
the design of an adaptation protocol (Paavola and Adger 2002):   
• First, given experience from previous rounds of negotiations, it is important that 
developing countries be included when it comes to decision rights. International 
negotiations have a history of becoming stuck as a result of unresolvable differences 
over decision rights between the North and the South.  
• Second, and closely related to the first point, is the issue of who has control over 
funding of adaptation projects. It is important for industrialized countries not to give 
away control over their money flow and to ensure that the funds are actually used for 
their intended purpose, i.e. adaptation to climate change. At the same time it is 
important to give developing countries a say in how and where investments should be 
made. 
• Third, therefore, in the negotiation phase of an adaptation protocol it is important who 
has the agenda-setting power. Ideally this should be shared between developing and 
developed countries. For instance, given the dilemmas pointed out in bullet points 1 
and 2, both Parties would have important stakes in deciding guidelines for 
identification of most vulnerable areas and countries.  
• Fourth, an adaptation protocol must define rights for countries to receive financing 
for adaptation (for instance, through guidelines for identifying adaptive capacity), and 
define possible solutions (for instance, sustainable development-driven policies and 
measures): capacity building, expertise exchange, technology transfer, guidelines for 
cost-effective national adaptation strategies, etc. 
• Fifth, an adaptation protocol secures that action is taken internationally, so that 
responsibility for adaptation measures is not merely pushed downwards to the 
national, local, and individual level. 
4.1 Conclusions  
The development of an adaptation protocol could be a way of better including the developing 
countries in the negotiations of the climate change regime. If so, developing countries must 
show more willingness to contribute and participate actively in a multi-stage regime where 
the aim is to strengthen mitigation policies (e.g., an agreement for the post-2012 period). 
According to our case-analysis in section 3, several relatively well-developed non-Annex I 
countries are ripe for graduation to stage 2 (or even stage 3). An adaptation protocol could be 
a form of side-payment or ‘carrot’ that could stimulate such graduation by non-Annex I 
Parties. Implicitly, such a solution would imply that industrialized countries are willing to put 
                                                     
18 Both legal expertise and a thorough analysis of the flexible mechanisms’ effect in developing 
countries are required to answer this issue. 
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adaptation issues higher on the policy agenda in the future, and that they are willing to pay for 
higher transfers of adaptation funds as a result of strong concern for the negative 
consequences that climate changes might inflict.  
An adaptation protocol might be a solution that can attract membership in a future, multi-
stage climate regime from both developed and developing countries.  
5 Overall conclusions and policy advice 
A multi-stage approach based on the CR index is interesting as an indicator for capacity to 
deal with climate policy commitments. However, the original CR index is not flexible enough 
for the purpose of differentiating between the countries of the world and graduating 
participation in a future staged climate regime since very different countries are placed at the 
same stage.  
We have assessed a number of modifications to the original CR index and have tried to find 
a more promising basis for differentiation and graduation of non-Annex I-countries. The 
emphasis has been on political feasibility. We have assumed that placement of industrialized 
countries in stage 3 (with absolute emission reduction targets) and least developed countries 
in stage 1 (with no commitments to reduce emissions) would lead to the highest level of 
political feasibility. Some improvements in terms of political feasibility have been achieved. 
The CR index and variants explored are capable of pinpointing important differences between 
countries, especially in the G77/China group. According to our assessment of political 
feasibility, the most promising cases are case 4 (original CR index with HDI grouping), case 7 
(normalized CR index with governance), and case 8 (normalized CR index with governance 
and institutional affiliation). 
The most likely candidates among non-Annex I countries for near-term graduation to stage 
3 are Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Cyprus, Israel, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay. We believe it is less likely that OPEC countries will accept placement in stage 3, 
but possibly in stage 2. 
Although the multi-stage approach is promising in many aspects, it may be too complicated 
for direct use in the multilateral climate negotiations. Therefore there may be need for a 
simpler model which is easily accessible for all Parties. 
Given the political feasibility limitations of the multi-stage approach, additional elements 
that add flexibility could be useful. Adaptation to climate change is a climate policy-related 
element that is of interest in this context. A direct link between a multi-stage agreement and 
adaptation is difficult. Instead we find that a separate protocol on adaptation is a better choice. 
A realistic strategy for Norway is to support flexible agreements for future action in 
upcoming negotiations, and among these a staged approach as explored in this study. On a 
bilateral note, Norway should engage in discussions with the most likely candidate countries 
among the non-Annex I group to enter stage 3 and take on absolute emission reduction 
commitments. In these discussions, provisions for theses countries taking up more binding 
commitments as part of a global climate action should be explored, both with regard to 
timing, type of commitments, differentiation of commitments, and relations to adaptation 
policies and support from Annex I countries. 
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Table A.1. CR index values for all countries in three cases 
Country Case 1 Case 3 Case 7  Country Case 1 Case 3 Case 7 
Qatar 93.65 101.98 71.90  South Africa 19.06 25.72 30.68 
Luxembourg 79.68 89.01 76.30  Palau 18.70 21.43   n.a. 
United States of 
America 58.17 67.56 61.42  Libya 17.54 25.48 17.59 
United Arab Emirates 52.86 61.10 49.55  Turkmenistan 17.43 24.95 17.13 
Australia 52.85 62.31 59.71  Botswana 16.72 22.61 33.93 
Canada 50.30 59.73 58.39  Uruguay 16.37 24.70 33.99 
Ireland 49.79 59.15 57.70  Malaysia 16.04 23.97 28.40 
Norway 47.61 57.17 56.59  Kazakhstan 15.99 23.65 21.51 
Kuwait 46.18 54.56 45.49  Croatia 15.50 23.80 28.01 
Denmark 42.47 51.79 55.10  Venezuela 15.46 23.24 21.07 
Netherlands 41.93 51.35 55.79  Ukraine 15.10 22.87 19.28 
Belgium 41.66 51.08 49.90  Chile 14.56 22.95 35.07 
Bahrain 40.78 49.21 40.52  Bulgaria 14.44 22.40 26.46 
Iceland 40.18 49.59 54.82  
Saint Kitts & 
Nevis 14.24 22.68  n.a.  
New Zealand 39.58 48.84 52.34  Mexico 14.08 22.10 25.85 
Brunei* 39.24 47.91 41.72  Lithuania 13.83 22.25 28.73 
Finland 38.98 48.33 54.56  Mauritius 13.57 21.42 32.72 
Germany 38.89 48.14 51.39  Iran 13.15 20.47 20.75 
Austria 38.73 48.07 52.04  Belarus 13.06 20.96 16.89 
Singapore 38.52 47.54 52.74  Mongolia 13.03 19.71 27.65 
Japan 37.06 46.44 47.88  Latvia 12.55 20.78 27.75 
Switzerland 36.84 46.20 53.52  Brazil 12.53 20.28 25.32 
United Kingdom 36.74 46.10 51.42  Costa Rica 11.99 20.33 32.56 
Italy 35.16 44.36 43.82  Macedonia FYR 11.89 19.82 19.42 
France 34.99 44.31 46.46  Romania 11.73 19.51 22.59 
European Union 
(25) 33.64 42.64 46.28  Suriname 11.66 19.46 23.14 
Equatorial Guinea 32.55 39.58  n.a.  Gabon 11.54 18.02 20.23 
Sweden 32.51 41.97 49.88  Namibia 11.31 17.38 28.87 
Israel 32.01 41.09 41.18  Belize 11.19 18.56 28.37 
Spain 30.30 39.52 45.28  Turkey 11.12 18.63 20.60 
Antigua & Barbuda 29.74 37.74   n.a.  Seychelles 11.04 19.57  n.a.  
Greece 29.13 38.15 40.36  Thailand 10.89 18.57 25.40 
Czech Republic 29.02 37.70 38.99  Congo 10.88 15.82 13.79 
Cyprus 28.53 37.36 41.71  Panama 10.35 18.26 25.61 
Saudi Arabia 28.27 35.95 31.46  Korea (North) 10.34 13.07 15.28 
Estonia 27.58 36.11 39.92  Colombia 10.02 17.75 18.20 
Taiwan* 27.55 36.57  n.a.   
Dominican 
Republic 9.93 17.31 24.63 
Slovenia 27.27 36.22 40.18  Tunisia 9.73 17.18 28.95 
Korea (South) 27.00 35.88 37.00  Paraguay 9.64 17.15 15.38 
Portugal 25.85 34.82 41.86  Tonga 9.58 17.45   n.a. 
Trinidad & Tobago 25.77 33.78 36.07  Guyana 9.43 16.62 22.68 
Oman 25.58 33.28 36.56  Algeria 9.14 16.18 14.18 
Malta 23.03 31.78 36.85  Saint Lucia 9.08 16.85  n.a.  
Bahamas 22.58 30.73 37.83  Jamaica 8.86 16.50 23.63 
Nauru 21.63 24.36  n.a.   Uzbekistan 8.86 15.95 13.65 
Barbados 21.38 30.26  n.a.   Jordan 8.78 16.28 25.53 
Russian Federation 20.98 28.93 21.83  Fiji 8.60 16.18 23.69 
Slovakia 20.57 28.99 32.82  Lebanon 8.44 16.02 20.32 
Hungary 20.29 28.77 35.93  Dominica 8.35 15.78  n.a.  
Argentina 20.17 28.70 30.72  China 8.12 15.57 20.22 
Poland 20.15 28.65 33.78  Azerbaijan 8.09 15.55 15.51 
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Grenada 8.03 15.48   n.a.  Cameroon 3.68 8.69 14.53 
Serbia & Montenegro 7.94 10.67 15.54  Senegal 3.50 7.87 17.59 
Syria 7.81 14.91 15.11  Niue 3.30 6.03  n.a.  
Cambodia 7.54 13.22 21.04  Guinea 3.24 7.49 16.65 
Vanuatu 7.42 13.12   n.a.  Mali 3.18 6.44 16.25 
Peru 7.42 14.94 20.77  Chad 3.14 6.93  n.a.  
Saint Vincent & 
Grenadines 7.13 14.64  n.a.   Kyrgyzstan 3.07 10.08 13.84 
Bolivia 6.93 13.74 19.43  Ghana 3.06 8.74 18.93 
Swaziland 6.84 12.03 21.42  Laos 2.92 8.26 13.27 
Mauritania 6.80 11.45 14.89  Burkina Faso 2.88 5.90 15.44 
Maldives 6.79 14.31  n.a.   Madagascar 2.84 7.53 16.08 
Cuba 6.76 14.85 16.27  Gambia 2.81 7.33 19.62 
El Salvador 6.73 13.93 22.19  Kenya 2.73 7.61 11.87 
Iraq* 6.70 9.43 5.55  Nepal 2.73 7.77 15.06 
Ecuador 6.61 13.96 15.84  Togo 2.69 7.64 11.24 
Egypt 6.41 12.94 21.16  Solomon Islands 2.59 8.83  n.a.  
Samoa 6.07 13.76  n.a.   Cote d'Ivoire 2.58 6.57 12.36 
Guatemala 5.86 12.35 16.00  Zambia 2.58 6.47 15.87 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 5.82 13.63 15.29  Bangladesh 2.57 7.66 15.06 
Philippines 5.80 13.33 20.21  Haiti 2.55 7.18 9.98 
Albania 5.73 13.54 16.37  Uganda 2.44 7.37 12.74 
Morocco 5.72 11.92 22.94  Comoros 2.34 7.64  n.a.  
Indonesia 5.46 12.38 13.50  Tanzania 2.27 6.34 16.44 
Cape Verde 5.27 12.44  n.a.   Tajikistan 2.23 8.94 7.57 
Bhutan 5.19 10.55  n.a.   Yemen 2.22 7.04 12.03 
Cook Islands 5.09 7.82  n.a.   Benin 2.18 6.39  n.a.  
Nicaragua 5.06 11.73 17.07  Guinea-Bissau 2.16 5.66 9.87 
Zimbabwe 4.94 9.85 10.06  Nigeria 2.12 6.78 10.78 
Sri Lanka 4.94 12.34 17.03  Kiribati 1.92 4.65  n.a.  
Armenia 4.90 12.44 14.70  
Sao Tome & 
Principe 1.91 8.36  n.a.  
Sudan 4.79 9.84 8.92  Niger 1.89 4.81 12.40 
Honduras 4.61 11.33 16.84  Liberia 1.87 4.60 10.44 
Djibouti 4.48 9.02   n.a.  Mozambique 1.83 5.37 17.82 
Georgia 4.35 11.74 14.51  Myanmar 1.71 7.22 7.02 
India 4.34 10.29 20.21  Ethiopia 1.66 5.25 12.95 
Central African 
Republic 4.21 7.82  n.a.   Rwanda 1.66 5.97   n.a. 
Pakistan 3.97 8.94 13.52  Afghanistan 1.58 4.31 1.34 
Lesotho 3.97 8.90  n.a.   Sierra Leone 1.25 3.98 8.99 
Papua New Guinea 3.97 9.39 15.27  Malawi 1.18 5.06 17.03 
Angola 3.96 7.77 7.01  
Congo Dem. 
Republic 1.12 4.77 0.53 
Moldova 3.93 10.74 14.36  Burundi 1.07 4.46 7.67 
Vietnam 3.82 10.73 15.29  Eritrea 1.06 5.45  n.a.  
 
 
Annex I countries in bold. 
n.a.: not available since countries lack the governance index indicator. 
 
  
 
